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SUSTAINABILITY OF AUSTRIAN PUBLIC DEBT: 





Sustainablity of Austrian public debt is investigated in the context of political objectives such 
as stabilizing the business cycle, increasing chances for being re-elected and implementing 
the ideologies of political parties. Several tests indicate that Austrian fiscal policies were 
sustainable in the period 1960–1974, while from 1975 on, public debt grew much more 
rapidly. The development of public debt in Austria seems to be driven not primarily by 
ideology, but by structural causes and a shift in the budgetary policy paradigm. We find some 
empirical evidence that governments in Austria dominated by one party run higher deficits 
than coalition governments. There are no indications of a political business cycle. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last twenty years, rising public debt has become a key issue in economic policy 
debates in many European countries, including Austria. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
and the Maastricht fiscal criteria for entry into the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) aimed at securing sustainable fiscal policies. More recently, however, it has turned out 
that the rules of the SGP could not be enforced, and that fiscal deficits have surpassed the 3 
percent of GDP limit in several EMU countries. Amendments to the SGP rules are being 
widely discussed, and many observers question policy makers’ determination to stick to 
sustainable fiscal policies.  
Apart from the political debate about the SGP, the questions as to which fiscal policy is 
sustainable in the long run and whether policy makers are ready to succumb to sustainable 
fiscal policies are of interest. There is wide-spread agreement among economists about 
sustainability of public finances meaning that budgetary policy observes the long-term 
government budget constraint. According to this prescription, the sum of discounted future 
government budgetary surpluses must not be smaller than discounted future government debt 
including the initial stock of debt. The actual behavior of fiscal policy makers, on the other 
hand, is much less clear.  In particular, to judge whether fiscal policies in a particular country 
were sustainable over a certain period of time, much information about past, present and 
future government budgetary policies is required, and assumptions about several parameters 
are necessary for most tests of this question.  
Fortunately, Bohn (1998) has developed a comparatively easy test for sustainability of fiscal 
policy. His model starts from the reactions of fiscal policy makers to high or rising public 
debt. A sufficient condition for sustainable fiscal policy demands that policy makers increase 
the primary surplus as a reaction to increased public debt in the previous period, and that this 
reaction is sufficiently strong. Here we combine such an analysis for Austria with an   3
investigation of political influences on fiscal policies and an attempt at a preliminary 
evaluation of Austria’s public debt development. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section II briefly applies Bohn’s sustainability test to 
Austrian data. In Section III, some political determinants of Austrian budgetary policies are 
investigated as we test for the influence of unemployment, the ideologies of political parties, 
and political cycles. Finally, Section IV summarizes the results of the paper and discusses 
future prospects for fiscal policy in Austria. For more details on sustainability tests for 
Austria, see Neck and Haber (2006), for an earlier analysis along similar lines, Neck and 
Getzner (2001). 
 
2. Bohn’s Sustainability Model 
For the context of the US, Bohn (1998, 2006) developed a model to test whether fiscal policy 
is sustainable. This model can also be used as a starting point for a positive explanation of 
actual budgetary policy making. In his model, the following equation is estimated: 
  pst = ρ dt–1 + α0 + Α Zt + εt, (1) 
where pst denotes the primary surplus of period t, dt is the stock of central government debt in 
period t, and Zt is a vector of additional influential variables like deviations of GDP or public 
expenditures from their trend. The latter emerge as explanatory variables for the budgetary 
stance from the tax-smoothing theory of Barro (1979), but they did not become significant for 
Austrian data. All variables in (1) are measured as their respective ratios to GDP. Fiscal 
policy can be shown to be sustainable if in equation (1) ρ is positive and sufficiently large, 
meaning that fiscal policy makers react to a high stock of debt at the beginning of period t by 
increasing the primary surplus (or reducing the primary deficit) in period t.   4
Table 1: Bohn’s Sustainability Model for Austria (dependent variable: primary surplus 
of the federal government budget, ratio to GDP) 













² R   0.8438
F-statistic 56.3683
Durbin-Watson 1.8190
No. of observations  42
Period 1962–2003 
OLS estimation; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1 
 
Testing for a unit root of the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio by the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
and the Phillips-Perron test results in rejecting the hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% (ADF 
test) and 10% (PP test) significance levels, hence we assume stationarity of the dependent 
variable. Table 1 shows an estimation of equation (1). Inspection of Austrian data and several 
tests clearly show that there is a structural break in 1974/1975, when the effects of the first oil 
price shock hit the Austrian economy. Hence we introduce a dummy variable D75 (D75 = 1 
for the period 1975–2003). Multiplying this dummy variable for the period after 1974 by the 
coefficient for the debt-to-GDP ratio dt instead of the constant adds explanatory power to the 
model. To remove serial correlation of the residuals, two autoregressive terms have to be 
included. In the resulting estimted equation (Est. (1)), the sign and size of the coefficients 
indicate that the process of the development of primary surplus has a clear mean-reverting   5
tendency in the first period (1960–1974); that tendency still exists but is much weaker in the 
second period (1975–2003). 
 
3. Austrian Fiscal Sustainability from a Public Choice Point of View  
Obviously, Austrian federal public debt has grown considerably since World War II, 
especially since 1975. To answer the question as to the reasons for this development, one may 
start with the fiscal policy concept of “Austrokeynesianism”, which has prevailed in Austria 
for some time. From the 1970s on, “full employment” (keeping down and reducing 
unemployment) was the central target of Austrian policy makers. The main instrument 
intended to reach this goal was expansionary fiscal policy – although the concept of 
“Austrokeynesianism” always included other elements, such as the “hard-currency” monetary 
policy, pegging the Austrian currency strictly to the Deutschmark, and the “economic and 
social partnership”, an agreed-upon policy of moderate wage and price increases negotiated 
by the employers’ and employees’ associations. Unemployment rose during most of the 
period after 1974, so this policy may have contributed to increasing budget deficits and, 
consequently, public debt. 
The ideologies of the political parties forming the central (federal) government can serve as 
another explanation for the growth of public debt. Left-wing parties are said to be more ready 
to accept budget deficits because they tend to engage in Keynesian stabilization policies with 
the aim of smoothing the business cycle and lowering unemployment. Price stability or 
balanced budgets are not that important for these parties. Right-wing parties follow the 
opposite path. They are more concerned about financial goals like small deficits or price 
stability than about unemployment or stabilizing the business cycle.    6
Another public-choice explanation of public debt growth is based on the different forms of 
government. If a coalition government of two or more parties rules a country, some public-
choice theories hypothesize that these parties engage in a “war of attrition”. Each party tries 
to fulfill obligations to its own voters (cf. Roubini and Sachs, 1989). As all parties are in the 
same situation, they expand government expenditures to please their voters and to avoid 
mutual conflicts with their partners in government. The result is increasing public debt. 
In contrast to the distributional conflicts sketched above, we can also think of the opposite 
effect. Coalition governments might find it easier to stabilize their budget because they have a 
larger majority in parliament. In a situation where only one party is in charge, a strong 
opposition might make voters think that the ruling party is solely responsible for the painful 
policies of budget consolidation. Ruling parties might, therefore, be reluctant to consolidate 
the budget. Coalition governments without such a strong opposition might have more courage 
and power to introduce the unpopular measures required to consolidate public finances. 
Fiscal illusion is another explanation for governments running budget deficits. It is 
hypothesized that voters systematically overestimate the benefits of present deficit-financed 
government expenditures (e.g. transfers) while underestimating the corresponding future tax 
burden. This means that they do not understand the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government. Politicians react to such fiscal illusions in an opportunistic way. Particularly 
before elections, they increase government expenditures in order to be re-elected by “fiscally 
illuded” voters. This theory has dramatic consequences for Keynesian stabilization policies: 
Politicians are willing to increase deficits during recessions, but are not willing to increase the 
primary surplus sufficiently when the recession is over. 
The theory of fiscal illusion is related to the literature on political business cycles in the sense 
that there is an incentive for politicians to promise or actually realize an increase in transfers   7
or a decrease in taxes before elections. An additional consideration entering fiscal policy 
making might be the time left until the next elections, because voters can be assumed to be 
myopic. Painful budget consolidation policies may be more likely immediately after elections 
than in the period shortly before the next elections. A major problem with fiscal illusion and 
political business cycle theories is that they may explain short-term fluctuations in output and 
government debt but are not able to explain different development patterns between countries 
and the long-term growth of government debt in several European countries (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1995). 
 
3.1 Unemployment and Fiscal Policies 
Table 2 presents an estimation of Bohn’s sustainability model of fiscal policy with the rate of 
unemployment UR included as an explanatory variable (as the only element of the vector Zt). 
The estimator for the influence of the unemployment rate UR is significantly negative, 
corresponding to our expectations (Est. (2)). The results of this estimation again suggest a 
significant reaction of the primary surplus to the debt-to-GDP ratio of the previous year and, 
in addition, to the rate of unemployment. An increase in the unemployment rate by one 
percentage point would ceteris paribus lead to a reduction in the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio 
of more than 0.7 percentage points. Such a reaction can be explained by automatic stabilizers 
and by discretionary counter-cyclical policies (“deficit spending”). The reaction of fiscal 
policy makers to increasing unemployment further weakens the sustainability orientation 
beyond the already lower reactions of policy makers to increased public debt in the second 
period (1975–2003).   8
Table 2: Influence of the Unemployment Rate on Budgetary Policies in Austria 
(dependent variable: primary surplus of the federal government budget, ratio to GDP) 
  Est. (2)  Est. (3)  Est. (4) 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic) 
Constant –4.0096 –3.9997 -4.2874 
  (–10.2096**) (–14.4106**) (-10.0228**) 
dt–1  0.4472 0.3178 0.335800 
  (10.0417**) (11.5918**) (8.0280**) 
dt–1·D75  –0.2825 –0.1147 -0.249569 
  (–8.9082**) (–3.4194**) (-7.2122**) 
UR  –0.7190  
  (–3.9841**)  
UR·D75  –1.0481  
 (–5.9731**)  
UR–UR(HP)  -0.977696 
  (–3.4360**) 
AR(1)  0.7153 0.5794 0.748542 
 (4.7327**) (4.2237**) (4.7624**) 
AR(2)  –0.3903 –0.5213 -0.341223 
 (–2.4802*) (–3.7610**) (–2.0985**) 
² R   0.8831 0.8949 0.8767 
F-statistic 62.9354 70.8459 59.3039 
Durbin-Watson 1.9130 1.9214 1.8115 
No. of observations  42 42 42 
OLS estimation; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1 
 
Further tests show that the reactions of fiscal policy makers to rising unemployment are 
different in the two sub-periods. Estimating the model separately for the periods before and 
after 1974/1975 leads to an insignificant coefficient for the unemployment rate in the first 
period (1960–1974) while the coefficient is significantly negative for the second period. Est. 
(3) presents such evidence on the reactions of fiscal policy to the rate of unemployment after 
1974. Austrian decision makers apparently react strongly to rising unemployment rates by 
driving down the primary surplus to an extent that more than compensates for increases in the 
primary surplus as a reaction to higher debt-to-GDP ratios. If the unemployment rate   9
increased by one percentage point during the years 1975 to 2003, the primary surplus-to-GDP 
ratio was reduced by more than one percentage point.  
Another hypothesis sometimes proposed in the public-choice literature states that 
governments tend to smoothen the rate of unemployment and react only to deviations of the 
actual rate from a natural or trend rate of unemployment. The latter can be made operational 
by applying an HP filter. Trying several alternative specifications with the HP filter did not 
yield significantly better results than the pervious specifications. For the influence of the 
deviation of the actual from the trend rate of unemployment, see Est. (4). 
As a conclusion, the estimations still show a mean-reverting process for the whole period, 
which is significantly reduced in the period 1975–2003. This means that the primary surplus 
(measured as a ratio to GDP) reacted to changes in the central government’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio. However, after the first oil price shock, this reaction was significantly lower than 
before. Instead, the rate of unemployment played a more important role in the sense of a 
counter-cyclical (Keynesian) orientation of Austrian fiscal policy.  
 
3.2 Influence of the GDP Growth Rate 
Instead of the rate of unemployment, cyclical influences may also be reflected in the rate of 
growth of real GDP. In this case, a low (high) growth rate of real GDP will result in a lower 
(higher) primary fiscal surplus or a higher (lower) primary fiscal deficit to counteract the 
growth performance of the economy under consideration. Moreover, high GDP growth might 
facilitate consolidating public finances, which acts in the same direction as the 
countercyclical policy hypothesis. Therefore we augment the previous specifications by 
including the GDP growth rate. Est. (5) in Table 3 gives the best result among the 
specifications including GDP growth. The respective coefficient is clearly insignificant. We   10
conclude that higher GDP growth in Austria does not necessarily lead to lower or higher 
primary deficits. 
Table 3: Effect of the growth rate of real GDP on budgetary policies in Austria 
(dependent variable: primary surplus of the federal government budget, ratio to GDP) 

















² R   0.8824
F-statistic 52.2964
Durbin-Watson 1.9780
No. of observations  42
Period 1962–2003 
OLS estimation; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1 
 
3.3 Influence of an Interest Rate Shock 
Interest payments influence public debt directly, and the rate of interest influences public 
finances through several channels, hence it is straightforward to test for an influence of 
interest rates on the primary surplus. Several alternative specifications are possible, including 
the level of the rate of interest, differences in the interest rate, or deviations of the interest rate 
from some long-run average (an interest rate shock).   11
In no specifications tested did the interest rate variable become significant for Austria for the 
period 1962 to 2003 or a sub-period. Interest rates tried were the secondary market yield of 
central government bonds and money market rates (EONIA and EURIBOR interest rates and 
their respective “predecessors” before the EMU). 
 
3.4 Influence of Political Ideology 
Next, we tested whether ideology played an important role in explaining fiscal policy. We 
hypothesize that left-wing parties, when playing a crucial role in government, place more 
emphasis on reducing unemployment and on stabilization policies in general. Such policies 
could lead to lower rates of unemployment but at the same time increase the budget deficit 
and lower the primary surplus. Furthermore, left-wing parties may try to influence income 
distribution and may care less about allocative efficiency. In contrast, right-wing parties may 
be said to accept higher unemployment rates but to care more about the stability of the federal 
budget. In the Austrian political system, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) broadly fall under the 
category of “left-wing” parties while the conservative (Christian Democratic) Austrian 
People’s Party (ÖVP) may be characterized as “right wing” in the above sense. 
Given this characterization, it could be argued that the structural break in the time series 
might be attributable to the change of government from an ÖVP dominated one to an SPÖ 
dominated government in 1970. However, a series of breakpoint tests clearly indicates that 
the crucial breaking point occurred in 1975 and not before.  
Next, we included a dummy variable SP for the periods from 1960 to 1966 and from 1971 to 
1999. SP denotes the participation of the Social Democrats in government. From 1960 to 
1966 and from 1983 to 1999, the Social Democrats governed in coalitions with other parties, 
while during the years 1971 to 1982, they had sole governmental responsibility in Austria.   12
We hypothesized that the Social Democrats were more likely to reduce the primary surplus 
and used the specification that adds the rate of unemployment UR as an explanatory variable. 
Est. (6) in Table 4 shows no significant influence of social-democratic participation in 
government on the primary surplus. In accordance with our expectations, the coefficient has a 
negative sign, but it is completely insignificant.  
Table 4: Influence of the Ideology of Political Parties on Budgetary Policies in Austria 
(dependent variable: primary surplus of the federal government budget, ratio to GDP) 
  Est (6)  Est. (7)  Est. (8)  Est. (9) 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
Constant  –3.7743 –3.1042 –3.2503 –2.9972 
  (–7.4179**) (–7.6649**) (–4.8806**) (–4.5189**) 
dt–1  0.4383 0.4107 0.4110 0.4038 
  (9.1910**) (10.2593**) (8.3988 **)  (8.3617 **) 
dt–1·D75  –0.2772 –0.2421 –0.2488 –0.2400 
  (–8.5334**) (–8.3983**) (–6.5327 **)  (–6.3527 **) 
UR  –0.6982 –0.8017 –0.8191 –0.8653 
  (–3.7831**) (–5.6670**) (–4.0439**) (–4.5140**) 
SP (=1 for period  –0.2221   
1960–1966, 1971–1999)  (-0.7464)   
SPFC (=1 for   –0.7845   
period 1971–1999) (–3.3662**)    
SPA (=1 for   –0.4986  
period 1971–1983) (–1.3662)   
SPDOM (=1 for    –0.6270 
period 1971–1986)   (–1.8487(*)) 
AR(1)  0.6930 0.5773 0.7907 0.7644 
 (4.5727**) (4.0636**) (5.1638**)  (5.1782**) 
AR(2)  –0.4091 –0.5161 –0.4314 –0.4759 
 (–2.6248*) (–3.6095**) (–2.7314*)  (–3.0927**) 
² R   0.8815 0.9182 0.8854 0.8897 
F-statistic 51.8532 65.4750 53.8058  56.1258 
Durbin-Watson 1.9241 2.0418 1.8872  1.8776 
No. of observations  42 42 42  42 
OLS estimation; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1 
   13
The dummy variable SPFC denotes the period from 1971 to 1999 when the Austrian prime 
minister (federal chancellor) and the federal minister of finance were Social Democrats. Est. 
(7) shows that the sign of the coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. This 
indicates some deficit-increasing influence of the Social Democrats being in power on the 
conduct of fiscal policies.  
If we look at the years in which the Social Democrats formed one-party governments (the 
period from 1971 to 1983, encoded by the dummy variable SPA), the sign of the coefficient is 
again negative but not significant at a reasonable level of significance (Est. (8)).  
If we consider the period from 1971 to 1986, when the Social Democrats dominated the 
government – in the period of 1971 to 1983 plus the “Small Coalition” of Social Democrats 
and the (then predominantly liberal) Freedom Party from 1984 to 1986 – the coefficient of the 
corresponding dummy variable SPDOM becomes significant at the 10% level (Est. (9)). Thus 
there is some (weak) evidence that governments dominated by Social Democrats have led to 
higher federal government debt growth in the past. As this period is also the one in which the 
People’s Party was not in power, the result can also be interpreted in the opposite way, 
namely that there is some empirical evidence for a higher primary surplus (smaller budget 
deficit) in periods with the Conservative party in government.  
Summing up, there is some empirical indication that the participation of the Social Democrats 
in government tends to increase the primary deficit. However, the influence of such 
participation is much smaller than the change of the paradigm of budgetary policy regarding 
significant reactions to the unemployment rate. If we include a specification with a coefficient 
of UR only for the second period (1975–2003), all dummy variables for the participation of 
specific political parties in government become completely insignificant. This result indicates 
that – contrary to frequent presumptions in the Austrian political debate – the development of   14
the federal government debt in Austria is not primarily influenced by the participation of the 
Social Democrats in government (i.e. that fiscal policy is driven by ideology), but that 
structural causes and the paradigm shift in budgetary policy are the main driving forces. This 
seems plausible particularly because, from 1987 to 1999, the People’s Party was in a coalition 
government with the Social Democrats so that either party could have blocked a purely 
ideology-driven fiscal policy. Moreover, since 2000, a right-wing coalition has been in power. 
Yet there is still no strong empirical evidence that this has led to a paradigm change in fiscal 
policy. 
 
3.5 Influence of Coalitions and the Form of Government 
Having identified a weak influence of political ideology, we next turn to the form of 
government. According to some public-choice theories, one would expect that a coalition 
government might increase public debt and reduce the primary surplus. The estimation results 
for Austria show the opposite to be true. During the periods 1960 to 1966 and 1984 to 2003, 
governments formed by coalitions of two parties were responsible for fiscal policies. Except 
for the period of 1984 to 1986 and since 2000, the Social Democrats and the Austrian 
People’s Party formed the Austrian government. First, we test the influence of this so-called 
“Grand Coalition” by introducing a dummy variable GC. Est. (10) in Table 5 shows the 
results. The “Grand Coalition” did not lead to significantly higher budget deficits in this 
period. Instead, forming a coalition generally seems to affect the primary surplus in Austria in 
a positive direction, as is shown by introducing a coalition dummy COAL (Est. (11)). The 
effect is not only significant at the 5% level of significance, but also of remarkable size.   15
Table 5: Influence of the Form of Government on Budgetary Policies in Austria 
(dependent variable: primary surplus of the federal government budget, ratio to GDP) 
  Est. (10)  Est. (11)  Est. (12) 
 Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
 (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
Constant  –3.8827 –3.4983  
  (–8.7437**) (–7.2320**)  
dt–1  0.4379 0.3824 0.3712 
  (9.4751**) (7.7785**) (8.1285**) 
dt–1·D75  –0.2712 –0.2329 –0.2300 
  (–7.6873**) (–6.2208**) (–6.8106**) 
UR  –0.7776 –0.8006 –0.8018 
  (–3.5624**) (–4.1712 **) (–4.0011**) 
GC (=1 for period  0.2058 –2.4321 
1960–1966, 1987–1999) (0.6740) (–3.5939**) 
COAL (=1 for period  0.8106  
1960–1966, 1984–1999) (2.2781*)  
SC (=1 for period  –3.0846 
1984–1986) (–5.1154**) 
SPA (=1 for period  –3.3322 
1971–1983) (–9.0727**) 
VPA (=1 for period  –3.1018 
1967–1970) (–4.9253**) 
VKK (=1 for period  –1.4059 
2000–2003)  (–1.7941(*)) 
AR(1)  0.7615 0.8876 0.6764 
 (4.7818**) (5.5714**) (4.3606**) 
AR(2)  –0.4005 –0.4214 –0.5344 
 (–2.4528*) (–2.5983*) (–3.5131**) 
² R   0.8813 0.8935 0.9085 
F-statistic 51.7147 58.3092 – 
Durbin-Watson 1.8886 1.8665 1.9696 
No. of observations  42 42 42 
OLS estimation; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1 
 
For the last model, we split the constant of the regression equation into the periods when the 
Social Democrats or the Austrian People’s Party had sole responsibility (SPA and VPA, 
respectively) and when Austria was governed by the “Small Coalition” (SP – FP), the “Grand   16
Coalition” (SP – VP or VP – SP), and the “Reform Coalition” (2000 to 2003, a coalition of 
the Austrian People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party). Est. (12) shows the results. In 
periods when the Social Democrats had sole responsibility, the coefficient (the primary 
surplus-to-GDP ratio, apart from the structural break, the mean reversion and the 
unemployment influences) is smaller than the respective coefficient for other periods. The 
largest coefficient occurs in the period of the “Reform Coalition”, followed by the “Grand 
Coalition”. Wald coefficient tests (Table 6) show that the coefficients of SPA, SC (“Small 
Coalition”) and VPA are not significantly different from each other. On the other hand, the 
coefficients for VKK (“Reform Coalition”) and GC (“Grand Coalition”) are significantly 
different from all other coefficients. These results corroborate the findings discussed above. 
Table 6: Significance of the Differences in Budgetary Policies for Alternative Forms of 
Government (Wald tests) 
  GC SC SPA  VPA 
SC  (*)     
SPA  * –     
VPA  (*) –  –   
VKK  *  ** ** ** 
Wald test (H0: coefficients are equal); ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1 
 
In conclusion, this section presents some empirical evidence that governments in Austria 
dominated solely by one party run deficits that are higher than those formed by coalitions of 
the two large parties or the two conservative parties in Austria. Coalition governments 
apparently find it easier to consolidate the budget and to deal with the resulting losses in 
popoularity. Alternatively, two parties in government control each other while parliamentary 
control by opposition parties in the case of only one party in office is not as effective at   17
stabilizing the federal budget. However, these results have to be interpreted with caution, as 
the estimations are not robust regarding changes of specifications. If, for example, the rate of 
unemployment is included only for the second period, the dummy variables denoting 
coalitions (GC, COAL) become insignificant and there is no significant difference between 
different forms of governments. 
 
3.6 Political Cycles in Austria 
Finally, we test some hypotheses on the political business cycle. According to this theory, we 
would expect smaller primary surpluses in election years (dummy variable ELECT). 
Moreover, primary surpluses might be increasingly higher the more time there is until the 
next election (variable DIST; in years). 
Table 7 shows the results of these estimations. We first test the hypothesis of lower primary 
surpluses in election years. Est. (13) presents the coefficients; those of the variables included 
previously are approximately of the same order of magnitude as in the models estimated 
before. The coefficient for the election year (ELECT) has the expected negative sign but is not 
significantly different from zero. This result is robust with respect to changes in the 
specification, e.g. taking into account reactions to the rate of unemployment only in the 
second sub-period. If the model is estimated only for the first or the second sub-period, the 
coefficient of ELECT is insignificant too.  
We next test the influence of the distance to the next election (Est. (14), variable DIST). 
Again, the estimation does not yield a significant coefficient, neither for the whole period nor 
for the sub-periods.   18
Table 7: Political Business Cycles in Austrian Budgetary Policies (dependent variable: 
primary surplus of the federal government budget, ratio to GDP) 
  Est. (13)  Est. (14) 
 Coefficient  Coefficient 
 (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
Constant  –3.9873 –4.0162
  (–9.7793**) (–9.9193**)
dt–1  0.4438 0.4462
  (9.6057**) (9.7776**)
dt–1·D75  –0.2805 -0.2819
  (–8.5575**) (-8.7068**)
UR  –0.7094 –0.7160
  (–3.8156**) (–3.8974**)
ELECT (=1 in  –0.0325
election years)  (–0.2481)
DIST (distance to next 0.0071
election, in years) (0.1204)
AR(1)  0.7196 0.7157
 (4.6803**) (4.6673**)
AR(2)  –0.3865 –0.3886
 (–2.4097*) (–2.4312*)
² R   0.8799 0.8798
F-statistic 51.0863 51.0127
Durbin-Watson 1.9223 1.9161
No. of observations  42 42
Period 1962–2003 1962–2003
OLS estimation; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1 
 
Therefore we conclude that there are no indications of a political business cycle in Austria in 
the period 1960 to 2003. 
 
3.7 Effects of the Maastricht Treaty 
Next, we investigate whether the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty had any 
effect on the Austrian primary surplus. A dummy is introduced which takes the value of 1 for 
the years from 1997 on. It seems plausible that the framework of the Third Stage of the   19
European Economic and Monetary Union might have put some pressure on national 
governments to reduce public debt and consequently also to increase the primary surplus. 
Table 8: Effects of the Maastricht Treaty (dependent variable: primary surplus of the 
federal government budget, ratio to GDP) 
  Est. (15)  Est. (16) 
 Coefficient  Coefficient 
 (t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
Constant  –3.7346
  (–10.9610**)
dt–1  0.4112 0.3497
  (9.2660 **) (7.5448**)
dt–1·D75  –0.2707 –0.2192
  (–9.8554**) (–6.5017**)
UR  –0.6216 –0.7791
  (–3.6077**) (–3.9343**)
MAASTRICHT  0.9495 0.7000
  (2.5880*) (1.8422(*))
GC (=1 for period  -2.2079
1960–1966, 1987–1999) (-3.2466**)
SC (=1 for period  -2.8164
1984–1986) (-4.6105**)
SPA (=1 for period  -3.1432
1971–1983) (-8.4041**)
VPA (=1 for period  -2.8933
1967–1970) (-4.5343**)
VKK (=1 for period  -1.5779
2000–2003)  (-2.0868*)
AR(1)  0.5714 0.6169
 (3.6653**) (3.7961**)
AR(2)  –0.3910 -0.5059
 (–2.4531*) (-3.1142**)
² R   0.8980 0.9152
F-statistic 61.1656 -
Durbin-Watson 2.0026 2.0089
No. of observations  42 42
OLS estimation; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.1   20
The results of the esimations are presented in Table 8. Est. (15) adds the Maastricht dummy to 
the basic estimation used in the previous sections. The Maastricht dummy is significant 
(although only at the 95 percent level) and shows that the primary surplus was 0.95 perentage 
points higher in the period under consideration. If the dummy is added to the equation used to 
estimate the influence of political parties (Est. (12)), it still remains significant (at the 90 
percent level) with a slightly lower magnitude of 0.7 percent.  
We conclude that the Maastricht treaty had some positive effect on the primary surplus in 
Austria. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the econometric estimations: 
1.  The Bohn model of sustainability of public debt in Austria is clearly supported by the 
data: The Austrian primary fiscal surplus of the central government reacts to high 
public debt to counteract the debt increase. However, this tendency was clearly weaker 
after the first oil price shock in the 1970s than before. A structural break can thus be 
identified between the years 1974 and 1975.  
2.  There is some empirical indication that the participation of the Social Democrats in 
government increases the primary deficit. Yet the influence of this participation is 
much smaller than the change in the paradigm of budgetary policy regarding 
significant reactions to the rate of unemployment. The development of public debt in 
Austria seems to be driven not primarily by partisan ideology; instead structural 
causes and the change in the budgetary policy paradigm (partly due to the ideas of 
“Austrokeynesianism”) are the main driving forces.   21
3.  We find some empirical evidence that governments in Austria dominated by one party 
run deficits that are higher than those produced by governments formed by coalitions 
of the two large parties or the two right-wing parties. However, these results have to 
be interpreted with caution as the estimations are not robust with respect to different 
specifications. 
4.  There are no indications of a political business cycle in Austria in the period 1960 to 
2003, which is in line with most previous empirical work for Austria. 
5.  The Maastricht process has contributed to the reduction of public debt growth in 
Austria. 
It remains to be seen whether the deceleration of public debt growth, which came about with 
Austria’s entry into the EU and the corresponding requirement of consolidating the public 
budget, will retain momentum and bring public debt down below the 60 percent of GDP level 
regarded as critical by the Maastricht treaty and the SGP. In any case, it is highly unlikely that 
levels of 10 to 15 percent, which prevailed before the first oil price shock, can be obtained in 
the foreseeable future. In that sense, the 1970s in fact brought about a fundamental change in 
the political and economic framework of many industrial countries, including Austria.    22
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